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This paper re-examines the direction of religious development implicit in 
Piagetian-based theories in light of a recent study of apostasy from funda-
mentalism. The theory-led and inductive thematic analysis of apostate narr-
atives reveals evidence of a ‘sociocognitive conflict’ that complicates the 
implicit teleology of traditional theories of religious development. The 
diverse trajectories produced by this interaction between sociocultural and 
cognitive influences prompts a fresh analysis of Howard Gruber’s question 
concerning the direction of development: Which way is up? I highlight the 
complex interaction between cultural and cognitive influences involved in 
apostasy from fundamentalism and provide support for Streib’s Religious 
Styles Perspective as a theory for investigating multiple factors influencing 






Religious Development: Which Way is Up? 
 
Why do apostates leave their fundamentalist folds? While the reasons for 
apostasy are diverse, this paper addresses the interaction between a 
theory-led claim that apostasy is a cognitive development and an inducted 
claim that it is a resolution to a sociocognitive conflict. Apostasy, an 
English transliteration of the Greek apostasis, means literally ‘to change 
standing’. Fundamentalism is notoriously difficult to define but is under-
stood herein as a way of knowing characterised by the primacy, perva-
siveness, and relatively premature use of assimilative cognitive strategies 
fostered in cultural contexts. Accordingly, while fundamentalism need not 
be restricted to religious cultures, some religious cultures are conducive to 
fundamentalist ways of knowing. Is ‘development’ ever an appropriate 
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description for the change that occurs when an apostate leaves the 
fundamentalist fold?  
 Theories of religious development, such as Fowler’s Faith Development 
Theory (1981) and Oser and Gmünder’s Stages of Religious Judgment 
(1991), traditionally privilege the cognitive dimension of the religious self. 
They assume a particular ‘logic of development’ (Streib 2001: 144) that 
leads in a linear direction from egocentric, exclusive forms of religion to 
more decentred and inclusive forms of religion. In the structural-develop-
mental tradition of Piaget (1971) and Kohlberg (1971), these theories of 
religious development implicitly and sometimes explicitly attempt to cross 
the divide between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ by positing a particular developmental 
imperative where the most valued contents of culture conform to the 
most accommodating structures of cognition. I use ‘contents’ in keeping 
with Oser and Gmünder’s (1991: 60) definition, to denote the ‘words and 
ways of religious practices’ which ‘form the basic religious knowledge of a 
certain culture’. I argue for the logic and value of structural-developmental 
perspectives, while highlighting the need for complementary perspectives 
that capture the complex interaction between cognitive structures and the 
contents of religious cultures in the ‘lifeworld’, or Lebenswelt, of an 
individual.  
 The study of apostasy from fundamentalism reveals that cognitive 
development does not always take centre stage in the theatre of the reli-
gious lifeworld and when it does, the price for its performance can be 
socially and emotionally costly. In developmental terms, the cost is associ-
ated with a ‘sociocognitive conflict’ (Doise and Mugny 1984) between an 
individual’s cognition and a sociocultural consensus. The characteristic 
fundamentalist fear of a Nietzschean nihilistic void beyond its own pro-
vincial certainties is perhaps not as developmentally childish as traditional 
developmental theories of religion first supposed. The study of apostates 
who step out of the cognitive certainties of fundamentalism prompts 
researchers in religion to reflect further on the dynamic interaction 
between the lifeworld of the individual and the cognitive operations and 
structures with which they navigate it. Collectively, the dynamics of 
apostasy from fundamentalism prompt a revisiting of Gruber’s (1986) 
confronting question in the context of religious development: ‘Which way 
is up?’.  
  
 
Religious Development: Room for Research 
 
The post-Piagetian field of cognitive development has undergone changes 
that are yet to influence a field of religious development still dominated 
by Piagetian-based typologies. For instance, researchers in cognitive 
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development have long acknowledged, but perhaps neglected to observe, 
sociocultural influences on cognition. In the context of cognitive develop-
ment, Doise and Mugny (1984: 7) write, ‘at the level of empirical investi-
gations, the issue of a possible feedback effect of the social on the 
cognitive is not considered; research goes no further than ascertaining the 
existence of correlations between the two domains’. Current theories in 
cognitive development grapple more consciously than their Piagetian 
predecessors with issues of domain specificity (Cosmides and Tooby 
1994), interaction between culture and cognition (Boyer 1994; Evans 
2000, 2001), and evolutionary understandings of cognition (Siegler 
1996). Neo-Piagetian and post-Piagetian conceptualisations of cognitive 
development emphasise the ‘natural selection’ and application of cogni-
tive operations in changing environments. As such, they invite a 
reassessment of the implicitly teleological and liberal Protestant direction 
of religious development in traditional theories like Fowler’s Faith Devel-
opment Theory. Fowler (1981: 273) noted in his own work a lack of 
theoretical exploration that takes seriously the structuring power of 
contents: ‘It is true, however, that in trying to construct these empirically 
founded descriptions of structural stages in faith I and my associates 
neglected, until very recently, any effort at a theoretical account of the 
interplay of structure and content in the life of faith’, a neglect implicit in 
the omission of Vygotsky’s (1962) socio-historical theory of development 
in Fowler (1981) and Oser and Gmünder (1991). Likewise, Reich (2002: 
12) acknowledges the influence of social factors on cognitive develop-
ment and notes his own lack of systematic attention to the relationship in 
Developing the Horizons of the Mind, where he proposes a cognitive 
developmental approach to the relationship between science and 
religion: ‘cognitive performance and development are not independent of 
the social context… While acknowledging this fact, social context is 
hardly dealt with here in any systematic fashion as far as discussing 
relational and contextual reasoning proper is concerned’. Such state-
ments obviously reflect the space–time demands of necessary research 
emphases rather than any scholarly oversight. However, it is dangerously 
easy for cognition to assume primacy in religious development in the 
absence of interdisciplinary studies.  
 Streib (2001: 143-44; see also 2005) offers perhaps the most recent 
and pointed challenge to the privileging of cognition in the process of 
religious development: 
  
On the other hand, the faith development paradigm, with its focus on 
religious cognition and its almost unquestioned adoption of the structural-
developmental ‘logic of development,’ needs to be qualified in order to 
account for the rich and deep life-world-related dimensions of religion—but 
also of fundamentalist turns. 
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The challenge highlights an enduring gap in existing research that can be 
filled with empirical studies of the interaction between sociocultural and 
cognitive factors. Apostasy from fundamentalism provides a context for 
examining post-Piagetian refinements to the field of religious develop-
ment, and subsequently, reassessing the direction of development. 
 
 
The Apostasy from Fundamentalism Project (AFFP) 
 
The Apostasy from Fundamentalism Project (AFFP) represents recently 
completed research at the University of Queensland, Australia.1 The study 
provides an exploratory thematic analysis of representative fundamental-
ist and apostate literature as well as 98 unstructured apostate narratives 
and 105 open-ended surveys. Surveys were administered online and in 
hardcopy format. Narratives were collected in hardcopy from regional 
participants and published anthologies and in electronic form from online 
archives of apostate narratives. Narratives and surveys were included on 
the basis of self-reported strength of identification as ‘fundamentalist’, 
and for Christian participants, level of past participation in a fundamen-
talist denomination consistent with Smith’s (1990) denominational clas-
sifications used in The American General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis, 
Smith, and Marsden 2002). Collectively, this data represents over 200 
self-identified apostates from Christian (n = 128) and Muslim (n = 75) 
fundamentalisms. The surveys and narratives were subjected to qualita-
tive theory-led and inductive thematic analyses with the assistance of 
data analysis software Atlas.ti Version V. Key Word in Context (KWIC) 
frequency analyses were used to inform some themes. The survey 
structure and theory-led thematic coding of narratives was informed by 
three representative structural-developmental theories: Fowler’s Faith 
Development Theory (1981), Oser and Gmünder’s Stages of Religious 
Judgment (1991), and Reich’s Levels of Relational and Contextual 
Reasoning (2002). The purpose of the project was to apply and to reflect 
on cognitive approaches to religious development. Accordingly, a set of 
‘meta-theoretical’ themes was also included to analyse narratives in the 
AFFP and inform a critique of cognitive-structural theories of religious 
development. These themes identified developmental ambiguities and 
anomalies as well as sociocultural and emotional factors influencing the 
direction of development. Several further themes related to physical and 
spiritual dimensions of development were inducted through an initial 
reading of the narratives.  
 
 1. The study was funded with an award from the University of Queensland Postgradu-
ate Research Scheme (UQPRS) and conducted between 2004 and 2007.  
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 The thematic analysis paid particular attention to the relationship 
between structure and content in fundamentalist cultures. While con-
ducted independently of Streib’s (2001, 2005) ongoing studies into 
deconversion, the exploratory AFFP provides support for his Religious 
Styles Perspective as a model of development able to account for the 
complex interaction between cognitive structures and religious contents. 
The diverse epistemological trajectories that apostates and fundamental-
ists take, and the complex cultural and cognitive interactions that produce 
them, give cause to revisit the direction of religious development. 
  
 
Apostasy from Fundamentalism as a Sociocognitive Conflict 
 
The study of apostasy from fundamentalism reveals sociocultural and 
cognitive influences on religious development. Somewhere in the narra-
tives of apostates from fundamentalism there are experiential facts: some-
thing happened and, for many apostates, something generic happened. 
What impetus can possibly cause enough dissonance for the apostate to 
leave the fundamentalist fold? ‘Leaving the fold’ is a telling metaphor for 
apostasy; the metaphor is used as the title for Babinski’s (1995) anthol-
ogy of former fundamentalist narratives and Winell’s (1993) social-
psychological analysis of apostasy from fundamentalism. It implies an 
internal impetus that leads the individual beyond the social security and 
cultural familiarity of the fold.  
 Self-identifying ‘apostates’ are rarely individuals who strayed noncha-
lantly from the periphery never to return; rather, they tend to have 
moved quite deliberately from the centre of the fold after months, years, 
and sometimes decades of intense deliberation. This use of ‘apostate’ is 
consistent with Introvigne’s (1997) differentiation between ‘defectors, 
ordinary leave-takers and apostates’ and Kliever’s (1995) ‘voluntary 
apostate’. The act of apostasy studied in the AFFP is altogether more 
deliberate and more reflexive than Introvigne’s ‘leave-taking’ and less 
socially motivated than ‘defection’ and ‘conversion’ where the destination 
is as clear as, or clearer than, the point of departure. Of course, apostasy 
eventually involves a reconstitution and, in some cases, this may be 
represented as a ‘conversion to’.  
 However, in keeping with other studies’ definitions of apostasy (Cap-
lovitz and Sherrow 1977: 30; Wilson 2004: 2), the focus of the AFFP is 
on apostates whose point of departure has little to do with a known 
destination. No doubt these are relative positions, but there is a qualita-
tive distinction to be made in that the majority of apostates in the AFFP 
leave before they know where they are going and substitute certainty for 
long periods of uncertainty. One apostate in the study characteristically 
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recounts having ‘Depression for a good 20 years, because I thought that I 
was wrong for a long time; that I walked away from the absolute religious 
truth’ (AFFP 2006: 338).  
 Thus, apostasy is a ‘walking away’ rather than a ‘walking to’. This is an 
important distinction in the identification of apostasy from fundamental-
ism as a sociocognitive conflict. The apostates of this study have little 
sense of leaving fundamentalism to embrace a new community with all 
the safety of its social structures. Rather, they perceive themselves as 
forced to leave the sociocultural security of fundamentalism to maintain 
their cognitive consistency. For many, in the early stages of apostasy, 
there is no clear vision of greener grass, just a strong sense of stepping 
into fundamentalism’s projected ‘vortex of nihilism’ (Boone 1989: 24). 
One such apostate recalls ‘Absolute terror at the instant that I realized that 
“no one is driving the bus”… I had suddenly become aware of a 
thousand foot cliff at my next step’ (AFFP 2006: 342). These apostates 
report being divided between culture and cognition, social security and 
truth. As such, the narratives of apostates are rich for a study of the inter-
action between culture and cognition: the exertion of opposing forces in a 
single psyche. Defined as such, the act of apostasy represents a socio-
cognitive conflict that problematises the linear direction of development. 
 Doise and Mugny (1984) first used the term ‘sociocognitive conflict’ to 
identify disequilibrium between sociocultural and cognitive forces operat-
ing within the epistemic self. They noted the intense discomfort experi-
enced by children in experimental situations whose individual level of 
cognitive operations produced responses that did not reflect the consen-
sus of the group they were in (1984: 154). In Doise and Mugny’s (1984: 
154) terms, ‘Conflict may exist…for an isolated individual when the 
operations he [sic] seeks to apply to a particular situation are contradicted 
by the existence of various social norms governing this situation’. 
Expressed in developmental terms:  
 
[…] sociocognitive conflict is a source of disequilibrium. It is disequilibrium 
that is at once both social and cognitive. It is cognitive disequilibrium in that 
the cognitive system is unable to integrate simultaneously its own responses 
and those of others within a single coherent whole. It cannot account for 
others and itself at the same time. It is social disequilibrium since this is not 
simply cognitive disagreement. It involves relations between individuals for 
which this conflict poses a social problem (Doise and Mugny 1984: 160). 
 
The dynamics of sociocognitive conflict are implicitly recognised in other 
studies of development. Writing on culture and cognition, Barnes (2000: 
17) proposes that, ‘A culture may maintain a simpler easier style of 
thought as its dominant style for many centuries or even millennia, even 
if some individuals go beyond the culture’s general achievement’. Do 
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some apostates go beyond the general cognitive ‘achievement’ of funda-
mentalist culture? Reich (2002: 150) also ponders the interaction between 
individual and societal development: ‘Has an individual only those char-
acteristics or patterns of behavior, A, that were generic to the group to 
which he or she had been assigned…? Or, B, could an individual develop 
outside that range according to his or her own dynamic of inner abilities 
and outer stimuli?’. Do some apostates develop outside the ‘range’ of the 
fundamentalist group? More pointedly, Wulff (1993: 185) recognises ‘the 
possibility that religious maturity may in some cases be expressed 
through the rejection of traditional religious views or practices’. Do some 
apostates feel forced to reject the traditional views and practices of their 
fundamentalisms as a mark of developmental maturity? Finally, sociocog-
nitive conflict seems implicit in Streib’s (2002b, 2007) ‘clash of styles’. 
Here, the apostate’s transition is the result of ‘intolerable’ dissonance:  
 
In some cases, the mutuality or the individuative reflectiveness resists com-
plete submission and surrender to the fundamentalist demand. The person 
experiences a clash of styles. Especially persons who are about to leave the 
fundamentalist orientation develop an awareness of the clash of styles up 
to the point where it becomes intolerable (Streib 2002b: 8). 
 
Do some apostates experience a clash of religious styles forced together 
by individual needs and community identity? Apostasy from fundamen-
talism is a case in which individual cognition and sociocultural identity 
are distinct enough to speak meaningfully about their separate influences 
and their interaction.  
 To identify apostasy from fundamentalism as the product of a socio-
cognitive conflict, it is necessary to provide evidence for three interrelated 
criteria: (1) that fundamentalism provides characteristically strong social 
and emotional incentives that prevent apostasy; (2) that fundamentalism 
provides characteristically strong emotional and epistemological disincen-
tives to the emerging apostate, and (3) that the cognitive structures spon-
sored by fundamentalist cultures do not match the individual apostate’s 
development. Based on these criteria, the AFFP provides strong support 
for the conceptualisation of apostasy from fundamentalism as the product 
of a sociocognitive conflict. The following ‘reasons to remain’ and 
‘reasons to leave’ are inducted from a thematic analysis of apostate 
narratives and survey responses. 
  
 
Reasons to Remain: 
The Social Attractiveness of Fundamentalism 
 
Fundamentalism provides strong social and emotional incentives to pre-
vent apostasy. The social attractiveness of fundamentalism is a prominent 
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theme in apostate narratives. Apostates frequently recollect the strength 
of their social ties within the fundamentalist community and express 
regret at the undoing of those ties, which often involve close family and 
friends. A key word-in-context frequency analysis of apostate narratives 
and survey responses from the AFFP revealed the most attractive 
characteristics of fundamentalism, as recalled by apostates. In decreasing 
order of frequency, apostates identify the following as the most attractive 
attributes of fundamentalism: friendship and family, sense of purpose, 
sense of belonging, sense of community, sense of certainty, feeling loved, 
sense of security, comfort, salvation, feeling of power, prayer, and 
happiness. These attributes are consistently related to the sense of social 
identity constructed and nurtured within the fundamentalist community. 
The attributes reveal the affective power of social connection that may 
conflict with cognition that is potentially disruptive to the social unit, that 
is, cognition that challenges group-identifying beliefs.  
 The social and emotional cost of apostasy during the transitional phase 
is high for most apostates. Of course, it is dependent on the level of 
commitment and social involvement of the individual apostate, but given 
the social structure and all-encompassing nature of fundamentalisms, this 
commitment is usually strong. One apostate typically notes, ‘All of my 
friends and activities were related to my religion’ (AFFP 2006: 42). Given 
the strength of these social ties it is not surprising that many apostates 
report feeling frustrated with their potentially disruptive thoughts. One 
apostate recalls, ‘I got frustrated because I couldn’t believe’ (2006: 39). 
Another characteristically labels the act of apostasy as ‘a reluctant 
parting’: ‘Leaving my faith was a very slow process. It was in many ways 
a reluctant parting and it’s hard to say how many years it took’ (2006: 
244). Such statements highlight the need to identify the internalised 
influence that, for an apostate, opposes the strength of their social iden-
tity. It is not adequate to depict the apostate as being against the funda-
mentalist community during the transitional phase. The fear, guilt, and 
confusion felt by apostates during the period of transition reveals a 
divided self. What is the other half of the divided self that somehow draws 
an often reluctant apostate away from the social comforts and functional 
truths of fundamentalism? Arguably, the emerging logic of cognitive 
development proves the stronger influence in some apostates’ lifeworlds.  
  
 
Reasons to Remain: Fear and the Demonisation of Doubt 
 
There is a second characteristic of fundamentalisms that emerges to 
counter apostasy during the transitional phase. Apostate narratives 
evidence strong disincentives to cognitive experimentation that could 
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challenge the fundamentalist culture. These disincentives elicit powerful 
emotional reactions from apostates during the transitional phase. A key 
word-in-context frequency analysis of apostate narratives reveals the 
main emotional effects of transition, in decreasing order of frequency, to 
include the following: fear, loss, confusion, guilt, rejection, depression, 
anxiety, grief, suffering, and anger. Characteristic contents of fundamen-
talisms that elicit such emotions concern eternal punishment and doubt 
about doubts.  
 Apostates’ narratives evidence a fear that their questions and doubts 
are the products of supernatural (demonic and satanic) attacks on their 
cognitive faculties. A Christian apostate typically recalls, ‘I can remember 
being in tears wondering if I was wrong or being deceived or going to hell 
or whatever’ (AFFP 2006: 205). Similarly, a Muslim apostate recalls, 
‘When I asked “where did Allah come from?” in one of the weekly circles 
I was told that this question was inspired by the devil’ (2006: 268). What 
is the cognitive effect of such culturally embedded beliefs? The fear of 
demonic deception has a paralysing effect on apostates that protects the 
fundamentalist discourse from the engagement of further doubts. It 
makes the discourse impervious to the possibility of conflicting contents, 
reasoned objections, and contradictory experiences, as they may, without 
exception, be attributed to supernatural deception. Descartes’ mind-
stirring demon is embedded and active in the contents of fundamentalist 
culture. Such contents influence the direction of development by restrict-
ing the diversity of cognitive interactions necessary for development to 
occur. At this stage, I offer this statement as an observation, rather than a 
value judgment of fundamentalism.  
 The direction of development is also influenced by contents concerning 
punishment. Abrahamic fundamentalists believe in eternal punishment or 
reward correlated strongly with belief. To doubt fundamentalist beliefs is 
to risk eternal punishment. Once asked to comment on the difference 
between an evangelical and a fundamentalist, the late Jerry Falwell 
(quoted in Boone 1989: 47) replied:  
  
Ask an Evangelical whether or not he believes there are flames in hell, and 
after a thirty-minute philosophical recitation on the theological implications 
of eternal retribution in light of the implicit goodness of God, you will still 
not know what he really believes. Ask a Fundamentalist whether he believes 
there are really flames in hell and he will simply say, ‘Yes, and hot ones 
too!’ 
 
Arguably, the relative difference in the level of certainty and literalisation 
in the fundamentalist and evangelical responses reveals a structural 
dimension affecting denominational divisions. Though not the focus here, 
it is worth noting that the differentiation between mainline conservative 
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and fundamentalist religion could benefit from a definition with a 
structural-developmental dimension. In such a definition, fundamentalism 
would represent a stage-specific way of thinking perpetuated by a particu-
lar culture, while conservatism would represent a more selected and 
relative response in a particular context.  
 In Christian fundamentalist culture, the potential apostate is confronted 
with the hell-like consequences of failing Pascal’s wager which posits a 
choice between the acceptance and rejection of Christianity based on the 
possible consequences of one’s choices. Pascal believed that it was more 
rational to believe and accept the rewards of Christianity than to suspend 
belief and remain unrewarded (Carter 2000). Alternatively, fundamental-
isms tend to emphasise the hellish punishment for suspending belief if 
one is wrong as a rational motivation for believing. In the divided and 
dissonant mind of the transitional apostate, the high emotional stakes can 
arrest or divert the application of cognitive faculties to fundamentalist 
belief. This fear of eternal punishment is strongly evidenced in the narra-
tives of Muslim and Christian apostates:  
  
The thought of rejecting Islam just does not bear contemplating. The 
concept of the Kafir and Apostate is built up so much that even now I am 
scared…that I am going to be struck down by a bolt of lightening or burnt 
eternally in the lowest pit of hell for my infidelity. Only a Muslim knows 
how strong this feeling is (AFFP 2006: 268).  
 
A similar fear is characteristically expressed in Christian apostate narra-
tives. One apostate describes an ‘Overwhelming sadness to think that 
perhaps these thoughts or leaving the church would doom me to the fiery 
pits of hell—that I would be separated from family and loved ones 
forever’ (AFFP 2006: 258). The fear of literal hellfire is so prominent a 
theme in apostate narratives that it warrants identification and explora-
tion of the factors that first initiate it and then challenge it in the 
apostate’s mind.  
 In fundamentalist culture, the apostate’s challenge to the literalised 
binary division between Heaven and Hell is attributed not to cognitive 
development, but often to moral degeneracy (McDowell 1979: 10-11; 
McDowell and Stewart 1980: 127). Apostate narratives are viewed as 
simply the retrospective rationalisations of moral failings that made the 
standards of fundamentalism difficult to maintain. Rather than repent of 
their moral failings and return to the fold, fundamentalists commonly 
believe that apostates rationalise their immoral lifestyles by fabricating 
intellectual difficulties with fundamentalism. Undoubtedly, there are cases 
where this description provides some explanatory insight. However, it 
simply does not fit the evidence from the AFFP as a general explanatory 
theory. It does not account for doubts initiated by increasing cognitive 
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interplay rather than by changes in moral behaviour, and there is no 
empirical evidence to show a long-term correlation between apostasy and 
moral degeneracy. Many apostates merely report new ways of construct-
ing moral judgments that may reinforce or reconstruct the content of 
previous moral judgments:  
  
My rejection of the existence of God has not led to a nihilistic rampage of 
debauchery and lechery… I am able to make moral decisions without the 
aid of the ‘still small voice’ or the bible. I am not a slave to sin. I haven’t 
been filled with ‘six devils, each more evil than the original’ (AFFP 2006: 
231).  
 
Self-identifying apostates who remain within their parent religion provide 
similar evidence: ‘I still look to the scriptures for guidance, but I am look-
ing at them through a different lens, so some of my conclusions now are 
different as to what is right or wrong’ (AFFP 2006: 109). Collectively, 
such responses indicate the possibility of a structural change rather than 
moral degeneracy effecting apostasy from fundamentalism. 
 
 
Reasons to Remain: Perfect Knowledge 
 
There is another group of contents evident in apostate narratives that pre-
emptively restricts the application of developing cognitive faculties to the 
fundamentalist domain. Fundamentalist contents create the illusion that 
existing knowledge is perfectly able to assimilate all possible contents 
(past, present, and future) encountered. There is no need for further 
accommodation because the received knowledge is perfectly adequate 
for all environments and contingencies. The fundamentalist contents that 
strengthen the illusion that fundamentalist knowledge is final knowledge 
usually pertain to revealed knowledge in the form of a sacred text. A 
Muslim apostate reflects on this closed epistemology as a characteristic of 
their former fundamentalism:  
  
Of course the source of Islam is the Quran and the books written by Muslim 
scholars. Therefore, I felt no need to look elsewhere in order to find the 
truth, as I was convinced that I have already found it. As Muslims say… 
The search for knowledge after gaining it is unnecessary (AFFP 2006: 268).  
 
Revealed knowledge is knowledge claimed to be received directly from a 
transcendent source. There is no higher form of knowledge than revealed 
knowledge because there is no higher source of knowledge than the 
posited supernatural agent: an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent 
God. If knowledge is attributed to a transcendent source, then all temporal 
restrictions and qualifications can be bypassed. For the fundamentalist, 
the knowledge of special revelation forms a perfect source, superior to, 
and able to assimilate, all empirical knowledge. Common expressions 
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such as ‘God said it, I believe it, that settles it’ and ‘Allah knows best’ 
permeate the fundamentalist culture and, by attachment, reinforce par-
ticular contents and their embedded structures. Thus any structural 
change that could affect the expression of these contents must overcome 
powerful emotional and epistemological commitments to their divine 
status. These commitments affect the course of religious development.  
 Fundamentalists tend to be people of one revealed book which takes 
primacy in all matters of knowledge (Boone 1989; Bruce 2000; Hood, 
Hill, and Williamson 2005). In fundamentalism, the revealed text is 
imbued with the magical-numinous qualities of its supernatural source. 
This totalising conception of authority is revealed in fundamentalist litera-
ture. Prominent Christian apologist, Gleason Archer, writes in Alleged 
Errors and Discrepancies in the Original Manuscripts of the Bible, ‘We 
must therefore conclude that any event or fact related in Scripture—
whether it pertains to doctrine, science, or history—is to be accepted by 
the Christian as totally reliable and trustworthy, no matter what modern 
scientists or philosophers may think of it’ (quoted in Boone 1989: 25). 
Apostate narratives clearly evidence this understanding. One apostate 
typically recalls, ‘For years I lived with complete dependence on the Bible 
as my source of reality and truth’ (AFFP 2006: 229). This textual authority 
is sometimes acknowledged as the key characteristic of fundamentalisms. 
Hood, Hill, and Williamson (2005) define fundamentalism in The Psy-
chology of Fundamentalism with an ‘intratextual’ model: fundamentalists 
are those whose thinking is dominated by a single text. For example, 
more extreme fundamentalist groups such as the Sunni Faramawiyyah 
prohibit education through any other text than the Koran (Dekmejian 
1985: 79). Likewise, some ultra-fundamentalist Christian groups will only 
use the King James Version of scripture to educate their children. 
 Culture and cognition interact in ways that enable the cultural contents 
of the sacred text used by fundamentalists to perpetuate a particular type 
of cognitive operation. The issue is inadvertently recognised by 
Korniejczuk (1993: 11-12) who notes a potential clash between cognitive 
developmental structures and biblical contents:  
  
For people who genuinely believe in the existence of a transcendent God, 
in His intervention in human affairs, and in the divine inspiration of His 
Holy Word…the course of their religious development may be different 
because they grow in their religious development adopting a biblical theo-
retical framework as their source of beliefs and as their basic conceptual 
presuppositions.  
 
Is it possible that fundamentalists do not grow in their religious develop-
ment because of the adoption of a single framework containing particular 
cultural contents? Is it possible that some apostates, to revisit Reich’s 
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(2002: 150) dynamic, ‘develop outside that range according to his or her 
own dynamic of inner abilities and outer stimuli?’. The question of 
whether or not developmental growth is valuable or adaptively advanta-
geous in all contexts will be considered in a later section. The immediate 
task is to illustrate evidence from the AFFP that apostasy from funda-
mentalism is a product of cognitive development that creates a socio-
cognitive conflict.  
  
 
Reasons to Leave: 
When Culture and Cognition Collide 
 
Fundamentalist cultures are inextricably linked with cognitive structures 
that apostates characteristically and gradually find inadequate. How are 
particular cognitive structures embedded in fundamentalist culture and 
what evidence is that there that some acts of apostasy are products of a 
sociocognitive conflict? While adopted throughout, Doise and Mugny’s 
(1984) concept of a ‘sociocognitive’ conflict could perhaps be more accu-
rately, but awkwardly, described as a ‘sociocognitive–cognitive’ conflict. 
This is because the socially cohesive culture of fundamentalism actually 
sponsors a particular form of cognitive operations that comes into conflict 
with apostates’ emerging operations. Streib’s (2002a, 2005, 2007) studies 
of deconverts found that they scored consistently higher on Fowler’s faith 
development scale than the members of their former affiliations. A quali-
tative coded content analysis of apostate narratives in the AFFP supports 
these results. Apostate responses consistently reveal a structural change 
across multiple aspects (i.e. symbolic function, perspective-taking, form of 
logic, moral judgment, world coherence, social awareness, and locus of 
authority) that reflects Fowler’s underlying logic of cognitive develop-
ment. Moreover, the difficulty of this structural change seems causally 
related to the strength of fundamentalist contents that sponsor early struc-
tures and hamper the development of later structures. Some examples 
may serve to illustrate the point. 
 Consider the development of Fowler’s aspect of symbolic function. 
Symbolic function relates to the developing perception of a relationship 
between the symbol and the symbolised. The trajectory of development 
for this aspect moves through magical, literal, separation, and rejoining 
phases of symbolism. The early stages are marked by an inability to 
appreciate the concept of a symbolic relationship and a subsequent ten-
dency to literalise and reject multiple interpretations. The separation stage 
is marked by a tendency to separate the symbol from the symbolised. 
This newly developed critical appreciation sometimes manifests as a 
sceptical devaluing of the symbol. In the final stage of development, the 
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symbol and symbolised are recognised as complementary concepts. They 
are rejoined with a new appreciation of this relationship. 
 Apostates overwhelmingly associate their former fundamentalism with 
a more literal interpretation of scripture resulting from a lack of apprecia-
tion of symbolic function and a presuppositional commitment to scriptural 
authority: ‘The whole Bible is to be taken literally. Symbolic meanings? 
What are those?’ (AFFP 2006: 27); ‘Everything [in the Koran] was taken 
literally, symbolic meaning was not done’ (2006: 167). Such characterisa-
tions are consistent with the early stage failure to ‘distinguish between the 
symbol and thing symbolised’ (Fowler, Streib, and Keller 2004: 56).  
 Many apostate responses identified a later use of selective and com-
partmentalised symbolism applied to scriptures that may generate moral 
or scientific difficulties:  
  
I knew of the distinction between literal and symbolic, but often struggled 
with it. My inclination was to take things literally at first, especially if it was 
an issue of the Bible or faith, then if that didn’t work, try to view it as a 
symbol (AFFP 2006: 135).  
 
For apostates, the literalistic readings that characterise their fundamen-
talism eventually come into conflict with a developing appreciation of 
polysemy, contextuality, and relativity in symbolic functions. It is perhaps 
the fragility of the shift between literal and symbolic readings that defines 
some of the key debates in fundamentalisms. Apostate responses often 
reveal a literal-to-symbolic paradigm shift on contents such as the six-day 
creation, the virgin birth, the physical resurrection of Christ, the parting of 
the Red Sea, the three days of Jonah in the whale, and Muhammad’s 
splitting of the moon. The cultural insistence of the literal reality of these 
events in fundamentalism increasingly comes into conflict with the 
apostate’s application of emerging symbolic functions.  
 Fowler (1981: 244-45) characterises the later stages of symbolic func-
tion with a ‘post-critical rejoining of irreducible symbolic power and 
ideational meaning’. Many responses from apostates who had long left 
their fundamentalism reflected this rejoined relationship between the 
symbol and the symbolised: 
  
The journey went from literal, to symbolic, to literal (on a deeper level), to 
deeper symbology, and so on, on and on, over the years, and at the place 
my understanding is currently at seems to have evolved beyond it being 
an ‘either’ ‘or’ situation between literal and symbolic. They are melded 
together in my mind, and have become a new and fuller perspective with 
which I view all things in life. My mind has truly expanded in this area 
(AFFP 2006: 133-34). 
 
In developmental terms, this recognition of symbolic complexity and 
diversity evident in apostate narratives reflects a 
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that understands ‘the multivalent nature of the symbol […that] explicit 
concepts or ideas are only one of a set of possible meanings for a symbol 
[…and] the time and place relativity of symbols’ (Fowler, Streib, and 
Keller 2004: 58). 
 Apostate experiences of symbolic function reveal a variety of develop-
mental trajectories while reinforcing the general direction of development. 
Fowler (1981: 300) describes the development of symbolic function as 
leading to ‘a qualitative increase in choice, awareness and commitment 
regarding the symbols and representations, which express, evoke and 
renew one’s faith (symbolic functioning)’. This description accurately 
represents the qualitative change in some apostates’ symbolic function. 
For some apostates, the ‘renewal of faith’ involves the rejection of the 
symbolic set of a particular tradition. The cognitive effect of development 
becomes too powerfully opposed to fundamentalism’s protection of par-
ticular symbols—this produces a sociocognitive conflict that may, over 
time, lead to apostasy. 
 The logic of development is often evidenced in apostate narratives 
through the use of a colour metaphor. Apostates commonly reflect on 
their transition from a ‘black and white’ binary oppositional way of struc-
turing the world to a tendency to see and differentiate ‘grey areas’. 
Apostates reflecting on their former fundamentalist ways of thinking 
typically claim that ‘Everything is black and white’ (AFFP 2006: 135), 
while representing their post-fundamentalist thinking as recognising 
‘Many shades of grey [where] contextual meaning rules’ (2006: 134). 
One apostate’s narrative clearly articulates the transition beyond black 
and white binary thinking. The apostate identifies their former funda-
mentalist thinking as ‘very black and white’ and then identifies a period 
of transition, ‘that diminished around 18, 19, 20 years old’, followed by a 
later form of thinking that is: 
 
[…] not black and white anymore. Life, decisions, people, even God, are 
more complex than that, circumstances are never isolated, childhood and 
psychological makeup influences people more profoundly than I'd allowed 
for in the past… [N]ow I prefer to look at decisions as good or bad as 
opposed to right or wrong, and the good or bad is on a spectrum, whereas 
right or wrong was either or, no grey, and was independent of external 
factors (individual, personal history, mental illness, fatigue, resources) 
(AFFP 2006: 353). 
 
The above extract demonstrates the interaction between ways of thinking 
and the contents of thought. Observed fundamentalisms are consistently 
characterised by the following: a lack of tolerance for ambiguity, over-
simplistic categorisation, and dualistic ‘all or nothing’ and ‘black and 
white’ binary thinking. Anthropologist Judith Nagata (2001: 481) writes: 
‘It also reflects a mind-set uncompromising and antirelativist, as one 
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response to the openness and uncertainties of a cosmopolitan world, and 
to chart a morally black and white path out of the grey zones of 
intimidating cultural and religious complexity’. Such cultures of cognition 
characteristically reinforce a binary form of operations—what Reich 
(2002: 52) calls a ‘single-track choice of A or B’. Apostate narratives evi-
dence the contents that reinforce this form of operations. For example, a 
key word-in-context frequency analysis of survey responses in the AFFP 
identified prominent content binaries structuring fundamentalist thinking 
including: Heaven and Hell, God and Satan, good and evil, light and 
darkness, believers and unbelievers. These binaries were also prominent 
in apostate narratives along with other binaries that included the follow-
ing: saved and unsaved, lost and found, halal (permissible) and haram 
(forbidden), clean and unclean, Dar al-Islam (abode of peace) and Dar 
al-Harb (abode of war). While oppositional binaries represent normal and 
necessary operations, it is their relative frequency, strength, and extent of 
application that characterises fundamentalisms and evidences a self-per-
petuating interaction between cultural contents and cognitive operations. 
 The interaction between the social, emotional, and cognitive domains 
discussed in the previous section offers some insight into conversion to 
fundamentalism. Though it is not the focus here, conversion to funda-
mentalism needs an account in terms of the direction of religious 
development. Streib (2002b: 2) frames the question clearly: 
  
In terms of developmental theory: How can we understand that a person is 
able to perform formal operations in most domains which are relevant for 
business and every-day life and that this same person is not able, or not 
motivated, to apply formal-operational thinking to existential questions, but 
takes every word of a guru or fundamentalist leader as the revelation of 
truth?  
 
Fowler sees conversion to fundamentalism as made possible by a sort of 
cognitive compartmentalisation which allows for domain-specific com-
plexity with low inter-domain integration. Streib’s Religious Styles Per-
spective offers some explanation of the motivation for such cognitive 
compartmentalisation in the broader lifeworld of the individual. Streib 
(2001: 153) uses the metaphor of religious styles laid down in geological 
layers subject to fracture and upheaval as turmoil and trauma force older 
structural layers to the surface. Implicit in this geological metaphor is 
some form of regress or resort to a simpler, earlier style that reduces stress 
and aids coping in relatively confusing environments. A former funda-
mentalist minister apostate reflected: ‘Seeing things in black and white, 
with no grey areas, made life so much simpler. It precluded the need to 
think’ (AFFP 2006: 243). Apostasy from fundamentalism and adult 
conversion to fundamentalism reveal the potential for contextualised 
conflict between cognitive needs and social-emotional needs. Theories of 
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religious development pose a problem of primacy and direction. Who is 
developing—the apostate who leaves fundamentalism to pursue the 
application of ‘formal-operational thinking to existential questions’ (Streib 
2002b: 2), the convert to fundamentalism who reverts to an earlier 
cognitive style to find social and emotional security, or the ‘fundamental-
ist’ who claims that the application of formal operations to existential 
questions will eventually reveal the foundational inadequacy of formal 
operations and warrant an adult return to the fideistic faith of a child? 
This position finds some expression in the writings of presuppositionalist 
philosopher Alvin Plantinga (2000) and cognitive evolutionary psycholo-
gist Justin Barrett (2004). Arguably, such epistemologies further compli-
cate the definition of fundamentalism.  
 
 
The Sociocognitive Conflict: Who ‘Ought’ to Win? 
 
Let us revisit Gruber’s ‘Which way is up?’ question in the context of 
sociocognitive conflict: Against what criteria can the direction of religious 
development be considered ‘up’? As noted by psychologist of religion, 
David Wulff (1993: 182), ‘when we turn to religious development, it is 
virtually impossible to reach a consensus on how to conceive of the ideal 
end state’. It seems appropriate to explore the directionality of develop-
ment without the premature presumption that one has arrived at a final 
destination, especially one that can be captured with a literal description 
of its contents. In one sense, the closer religious development leads to 
Wulff’s elusive ‘ideal end state’ (if it exists), the less certain of its finality 
one will be. In terms of structural development, ‘up’ is the direction 
toward structures that can coordinate increasing levels of complexity most 
simply. Thus, fundamentalism (religious or secular) is the attempt to 
maintain the simplicity of a structure by ignoring or pre-critically reducing 
the complexity of the contents. It circumvents that adaptive process. In 
Piagetian terms, fundamentalism upsets the adaptive equilibrium between 
accommodation and assimilation by adopting a general strategy of 
assimilation. For a variety of reasons, some apostates become so pain-
fully aware of the disequilibrium that they accommodate the parent-
structure in order to better assimilate complex contents. For many 
apostates, their structural-cognitive change comes into direct conflict with 
the social and cultural contents of their fundamentalism.  
 It is implicit in traditional structural-developmental theories like Fowler’s 
Faith Development Theory that structurally developed stages of cognition 
ought to win in a conflict with sociocultural commitments to an earlier 
stage. But it would be unfair to accuse Fowler of choosing a priori 
cognitive development over social and cultural cohesion. Fowler, like 
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later neo-Piagetians, may simply argue that developing cognition is 
logically correlated with strong social cohesion: it merely enables the 
individual to broaden the boundaries of group identification. For Fowler, 
it is logically imperative that cognitive development should drive faith 
development. Tellingly, his predecessor Lawrence Kohlberg (1971) 
argued a form of prescription based on description wherein higher stages 
of development ‘ought’ to be aspired to because they can be shown 
empirically to utilise more intersubjective or objective reasoning than 
lower stages. In this perspective, there is no necessary or a priori socio-
cognitive conflict in the logic of development; the sociocultural and the 
cognitive are mutually dependent. However, a posteriori, where there is a 
conflict between an apostate’s cognitive development and their commit-
ment to the social and cultural cohesion of their fundamentalism, the 
former takes precedence. Why? Because the experience of some of those 
who leave fundamentalism reveals that the conflict can be temporary: 
social and cultural cohesion can be recapitulated at later ages and stages 
with broadening circles of identification. Thus, the ‘crises of faith’ that 
surround apostasy can be seen in retrospect as the growth pains of 
development. 
 Of course, the teleological optimism of traditional theories of religious 
development is confronted by the real complexities of content in the life-
world. Streib’s Religious Styles Perspective counterbalances the cognitive 
privileging of Faith Development Theory by providing ‘more-perspective-
ness’ and revisiting developmental theory from the ‘bottom-up’. It reveals 
the complexities of development in a lifeworld where cognitive develop-
ment is not always of primary concern. Streib’s Religious Styles Perspec-
tive pays attention to the realities of the lifeworld—it recognises the high 
social cost of apostasy and the relative security of fundamentalisms that 
self-perpetuate a state of equilibrium. The AFFP lends some support to 
this perspective. In the context of apostasy from fundamentalism, there 
are cases in which an individual’s cognitive development can threaten 
their social and emotional well-being, and the well-being of the funda-
mentalist group to which they belonged. Growth pains can be fatal for 
some individuals. However, Streib’s proper criticism of cognitive privileg-
ing implicitly affirms its place in the scheme of development by assuming 
the value of ‘more-perspectiveness’. In identifying the phenomenological 
insensitivity of the structural-developmental tradition, Streib implicitly 
affirms a ‘logic of development’ which values the development of the 
very cognitive operations that enable ‘more-perspectiveness’.  
 Those who are not fundamentalists (though who can really cast the 
stone?) probably value a logic and direction of development which 
expands inter-subjectively from the bottom-up to realise or reject 
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top-down claims to authority from scripture or sage. The study of apos-
tasy from fundamentalism reveals the fundamentalist tendency to invert 
this direction of development, to retreat from unknown destinations, or 
epistemologically detach from the developmental process altogether. 
Apostates’ experiences evidence the Nietzschean-like crisis beyond funda-
mentalism that can reinforce this developmental retreat or detachment. 
The apostates who seem to speak from beyond the ‘transitional’ crisis 
have not successfully exchanged certainty for uncertainty, known for 
unknown, Truth for truths, One for many, and God for gods, but can 
negotiate at and navigate between these symbolic poles with a develop-
ing understanding of what it is they symbolise. Some apostates continue 
to express this emergent ‘symbolised’ in theistic terms, and some do not. 
Regardless, the direction of development is perhaps best conceptualised, 
not simply as ‘up’, but more complexly as ‘into’ and ‘across’ the lifescape 
between culture and cognition. These directional turns may serve well for 
future studies of religious culture and cognition that appropriate the 





Apostasy from Fundamentalism Project (AFFP)  
 2006  Coded Data [material used in] Raoul Adam. 2007. ‘A Cognitive 
Developmental Analysis of Apostasy from Religious Fundamentalism’. 
PhD dissertation, The University of Queensland, Brisbane. 
Babinski, Edward T. 
 1995  Leaving the Fold: Testimonies of Former Fundamentalists. Prometheus 
Books, New York. 
Barnes, Michael H.  
 2000 Stages of Thought: The Co-evolution of Religious Thought and Science. 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
Barret, Justin L.  
 2004  Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Altamira Press, New York. 
Boone, Kathleen  
 1989  The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism. 
State University of New York Press, Albany, NY. 
Boyer, Pascal  
 1994 Cognitive Constraints on Cultural Representations: Natural Ontologies 
and Religious Ideas. In Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994: 391-411. 
Bruce, Steve  
 2000 Fundamentalism. Polity Press, Malden, MA. 
Caplovitz, David, and Fred Sherrow  
 1977  The Religious Drop-outs: Apostasy among College Graduates. Sage 
Publications, Beverly Hills, CA. 
 
 Adam  ‘Leaving the Fold’ 61 
© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009. 
Carter, Alan 
 2000 On Pascal’s Wager, or Why All Bets Are Off. Philosophical Quarterly 
50: 22–27. 
Cosmides, Leda, and John Tooby  
 1994 Origins of Domain Specificity: The Evolution of Functional Organiza-
tion. In Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994: 85-116. 
Davis, James Allan, Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden 
 2002 General Social Survey 2002. The Roper Center for Public Opinion 
Research, National Opinion Research Centre, Chicago, IL. 
Dekmejian, Richard H.  
 1985  Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. Syracuse 
University Press, Syracuse, NY. 
Doise, William, and Gabriel Mugny 
 1984 The Social Development of the Intellect. Pergamon Press, Oxford. 
Evans, E. Margaret 
 2000 Beyond Scopes: Why Creationism is Here to Stay. In Imagining the 
Impossible: The Development of Magical, Scientific, and Religious 
Thinking in Contemporary Society, edited by Karl S. Rosengren, Carl 
N. Johnson, and Paul L. Harris, 305-33. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 2001 Cognitive and Contextual Factors in the Emergence of Diverse Belief 
Systems: Creation versus Evolution. Cognitive Psychology 42: 217-66. 
doi:10.1006/cogp.2001.0749. 
Fowler, James W.  
 1981  Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest 
for Meaning. Harper & Row, San Francisco, CA.  
Fowler, James W., Heinz Streib, and Barbara Keller  
 2004 Manual for Faith Development Research. Centre for Research in Faith 
and Moral Development, Atlanta, GA.  
Gruber, Howard E.  
 1986 Which Way is Up? A Developmental Question. In Adult Cognitive 
Development: Methods and Models, edited by Karen S. Kitchner and 
Robert A. Mines, 112-33. Praeger Scientific, New York. 
Hirschfeld, Lawrence A., and Susan A. Gelman (eds.) 
 1994 Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Hood, Ralph W., Paul Hill, and William Williamson  
 2005 The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism. Guilford Press, New 
York. 
Introvigne, Massimo 
 1997 Defectors, Ordinary Leave-takers and Apostates: A Quantitative Study 
of Former Members of New Acropolis in France. Online: http://www. 
cesnur.org/testi/Acropolis.htm (accessed June 22, 2005). 
62 ARSR 22.1 (2009) 
© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009. 
Kliever, Lonnie D.  
 1995 The Reliability of Apostate Testimony about New Religious Movements. 
Online: http://www.neuereligion.de/ENG/Kliever (accessed June 22, 
2005). 
Kohlberg, Lawrence  
 1971 From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get 
Away with It in the Study of Moral Development. In Cognitive 
Development and Epistemology, edited by Theodore Mischel, 222-25. 
Academic Press, New York. 
Korniejczuk, Victor A.  
 1993 Psychological Theories of Religious Development: A Seventh-Day 
Adventist Perspective. Paper prepared for the International Faith and 
Learning Seminar, Institute for Christian Teaching, Lincoln, NE. 
McDowell, Josh  
 1979  Evidence that Demands a Verdict. Thomas Nelson, Nashville, TN. 
McDowell, Josh, and Don Stewart 
 1980 Answers to Tough Questions: Skeptics Ask about the Christian Faith. 
Tyndale House Publishers, Wheaton, IL. 
Nagata, Judith  
 2001  Beyond Theology: Toward an Anthropology of ‘Fundamentalism’. 
American Anthropologist 103(2): 481-98. doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.2. 
481. 
Oser, Fritz, and Paul Gmünder 
 1991 Religious Judgment: A Developmental Approach. Religious Education 
Press, Birmingham, AL. 
Piaget, Jean  
 1971 Genetic Epistemology. Norton, New York. 
Plantinga, Alvin  
 2000  Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford University Press, New York. 
doi:10.1093/0195131932.001.0001. 
Reich, Helmut K. 
 2002  Developing the Horizons of the Mind: Relational and Contextual 
Reasoning and the Resolution of Cognitive Conflict. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Siegler, Robert, S.  
 1996 Emerging Minds: The Process of Change in Children’s Thinking. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Smith, Tom 
 1990 Classifying Protestant Denominations. Review of Religious Research 
31(3). Online: http://www.questia.com/googleScholar. 
qst?docId=96619399 (accessed October 4, 2004). 
Streib, Heinz 
 2001 Faith Development Theory Revisited: The Religious Styles Perspective. 
The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 11(3): 143-58. 
doi:10.1207/S15327582IJPR1103_02.  
 Adam  ‘Leaving the Fold’ 63 
© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009. 
 2002a  Biographical and Religious Development in Christian-Fundamentalist 
Converts and Deconverts: A Narrative Approach. Online: http:// 
wwwhomes.uni-bielefeld.de/hstreib/ResearchNote.pdf (accessed March 
21, 2004). 
 2002b A Faith Development Perspective on Fundamentalism. Paper presented 
at the meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion in Salt 
Lake City, November 3, 2002. Online: http://wwwhomes.uni-bielefeld. 
de/ hstreib/Fund-FD(Streib2002).pdf (accessed June 5, 2007). 
 2005 Faith Development Research Revisited: Accounting for Diversity in 
Structure, Content, and Narrativity of Faith. The International Journal 
for the Psychology of Religion 15(2): 99-121. doi:10.1207/ 
s15327582ijpr1502_1. 
 2007 Faith Development and a Way beyond Fundamentalism. In Faith-
Based Radicalism: Christianity, Islam and Judaism between Construc-
tive Activism and Destructive Fanaticism, edited by Christiane 
Timmerman et al., 151-67. Peter Lang, Brussels. 
Vygotsky, Lev S.  
 1962  Thought and Language. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
doi:10.1037/11193-000. 
Wilson, Stephen G.  
 2004 Leaving the Fold: Apostates and Defectors in Antiquity. Fortress Press, 
Minneapolis. 
Winell, Marlene  
 1993  Leaving the Fold: A Guide for Former Fundamentalists and Others 
Leaving their Religion. New Harbinger Publications, Oakland, CA.  
Wulff, David M.  
 1993 On the Origins and Goals of Religious Development. The International 
Journal for the Psychology of Religion 3(3): 181-86. doi:10.1207/ 
s15327582ijpr0303_3. 
